

Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554

)	
In the Matter of)	
)	WT Docket No. 08-165
Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify)	
Provisions of Section 332(c)(7)(B) to Ensure)	
Timely Siting Review and to Preempt under)	
Section 253 State and Local Ordinances that)	
Classify All Wireless Siting Proposals as)	
Requiring a Variance)	
)	

COMMENTS OF THE CITY OF KASSON

These Comments are filed by the CITY OF KASSON to urge the Commission to deny the Petition filed by CTIA. As noted below, CTIA's Petition is without merit and without basis in law or fact. CITY OF KASSON also joins in the Comments filed by the National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors ("NATOA") in response to CTIA's Petition. Section 253 of Title 47 of the United States Code does not apply to wireless tower sitings. Rather, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B) governs wireless tower sitings to the exclusion of § 253.

Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i) provides:

(i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof-

(I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services; and

(II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.

Section 253 on the other hand provides that no local government may prohibit or effectively prohibit the provision of telecommunications services. The language in § 332 is specific to wireless service facilities, while § 253 address telecommunications generally.

Congress does not enact redundant code provisions. Further, the Supreme Court's ruling in *Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.*, 504 U.S. 374, 384-385 (1992), establishes that

specific code sections supersede general code sections. Section 332 is very specific as to the remedies and procedures to be followed with respect to wireless facility applications.

Section 332 (c)(7)(B)(v) provides that any person adversely affected by a local government's final action or failure to act may, within 30 days, file suit in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court must hear and decide the suit on an expedited basis. Further, any person adversely affected by local government act or failure to act that is inconsistent with clause 32(c)(7)(B)(iv) may petition the Commission for relief. The specificity of these remedies shows that § 332 applies to wireless service facilities to the exclusion of § 253.

The Commission should also deny CTIA's Petition with respect to the request that the Commission should supply meaning to the phrase "failure to act." The Commission's authority to interpret language in the Communications Act of 1934 is limited to areas of ambiguity. "Failure to act" is not an ambiguous phrase. The word "failure" means the "omission of an occurrence or performance;" the word "act" means "to carry out or perform an activity." Taken together, the phrase "failure to act" means to omit the performance of an activity. Contrary to CTIA's assertion, there is nothing vague or ambiguous about this statutory language which would entitle the Commission to issue a declaratory ruling on this topic.

In addition, Congress made it perfectly clear that the time frame for responding to applications for wireless facility sitings is determined by reference to the nature of the application. Section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) provides that local governments act on requests "within a reasonable time period, taking into account the nature of the request." Therefore, even if ambiguity existed in the statute, the FCC would be acting outside its authority by mandating a fixed time period and imposing a remedy for violating that mandate, where Congress clearly intended fluidity.

We have not had and applications for wireless facility sitings.
Respectfully submitted,

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